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1. Introduction
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be classified as belonging to two main groups
depending on the detection technique employed:
– signature-based detection,
– anomaly detection.
Currently, most IDS systems have problems in recognizing new attacks (0-day exploits) since
they are based on the signature-based approach. In such mode, when system does not have
an attack signature in database, such attack is not detected. Another drawback of current IDS
systems is that the used parameters and features do not contain all the necessary information
about traffic and events in the network (Coppolino at al., 2009).
On the other hand, anomaly detection techniques rely on the existence of a reliable
characterization of what is normal and what is not, in a particular networking scenario. More
precisely, anomaly detection techniques base their evaluations on a model of what is normal,
and classify as anomalous all the events that fall outside such a model.
In this paper, a new solution for Anomaly Detection System (ADS) system based on
signal processing algorithm is presented. ADS analyzes traffic from internet connection in
certain point of a computer network. The proposed ADS system uses redundant signal
decomposition method based on Matching Pursuit algorithm.
Our original methodology for network security anomaly detection based on Matching Pursuit
is presented and evaluated using network data traces. We also compared Matching Pursuit
approach to Discrete Wavelet Transform used by other researchers.
The paper is structures as follows: firstly, in Section 2 the motivation to use signal processing
techniques in intrusion and anomaly detection systems is provided. In Section 3 the anomaly
detection system based on the Matching Pursuit is presented in detail. The effectiveness of the
proposed system is evaluated in Sections 4 and 5 where the comparison to the state-of-the-art
method based on Discrete Wavelet Transform is shown.
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2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Feature ID Feature Description
1 ICMP flows/time period
2 ICMP in bytes/time period
3 ICMP out bytes/time period
4 ICMP in frames/time period
5 ICMP out frames/time period
6 TCP flows/time period
7 TCP input bytes/time period
8 TCP out bytes/time period
9 TCP in frames/time period
10 TCP out frames/time period
11 UDP flows/time period
12 UDP in bytes/time period
13 UDP out bytes/time period
14 UDP in frames/time period
15 UDP out frames/time period
Table 1. Network traffic parameters
2. Signal processing techniques applied to anomaly detection
Signal processing techniques have found application in Network Intrusion Detection Systems
because of their ability to detect novel intrusions and attacks, which cannot be achieved
by signature-based approaches (Esposito et al., 2005). It has been shown that network
traffic presents several relevant statistical properties when analyzed at different levels (e.g.
self-similarity, long range dependence, entropy variations, etc.) (Esposito et al., 2005)(Cheng
et al., 2002).
Approaches based on signal processing and on statistical analysis can be powerful in
decomposing the signals related to network traffic, giving the ability to distinguish between
trends, noise, and actual anomalous events. Wavelet-based approaches, maximum entropy
estimation, principal component analysis techniques, and spectral analysis, are examples in
this regard which have been investigated in the recent years by the research community
(Cheng et al., 2002)(Barford et al., 2002)(Huang et al., 2001)(Li & Lee, 2003)(Dainotti et al.,
2006). However, Discrete Wavelet Transform provides a large amount of coefficients which
not necessarily reflect required features of the network signals.
Therefore, in this paper we propose another signal processing and decomposition method
for anomaly/intrusion detection in networked systems. We developed original Anomaly
Detection Type IDS algorithm based on Matching Pursuit. As to our best knowledge, we
have not met any other IDS system based on matching pursuit.
ADS based on Matching Pursuit uses Dictionary of Base Functions - BFD to decompose input
1D traffic signal (1D signal may represent for example packets per second) into set of based
functions called also atoms. The proposed BFD has ability to approximate traffic signal.
In the proposed system we use 15 network traffic parameters shown in Table 1.
3. Anomaly detection system based on matching pursuit
Matching Pursuit is a known signal processing technique used for instance in audio
compression, image and video compression (Mallat et al., 1993)(Neff et al., 2002)(Figureas
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Fig. 1. Example dictionary structure
et al., 2006)(Shaopeng et al., 2002)(Daudet, 2010). However, as to our best knowledge, we are
the first to use Matching Pursuit for intrusion and anomaly detection in computer networks.
Matching Pursuit signal decomposition was proposed by Mallat and Zhang (Mallat et al.,
1993). Matching Pursuit is a greedy algorithm that decomposes any signal into a linear
expansion of waveforms which are taken from an overcomplete dictionary D. The dictionary
D is an overcomplete set of base functions called also atoms.
D = {αγ : γ ∈ Γ} (1)
where every atom αγ from dictionary has norm equal to 1:
∥∥αγ∥∥ = 1 (2)
Γ represents set of indexes for atom transformation parameters such as translation and scaling.
Signal s has various representations for dictionary D. Signal can be approximated by set of
atoms αk from dictionary and projection coefficients ck:
s =
|D|−1
∑
n=0
ckαk (3)
279ignal Proces ing Methodol gy for Network Anomaly Detection
www.intechopen.com
4 Intrusion Detection Systems
In the basic Matching Pursuit algorithm atoms are selected in every step from entire dictionary
which has flat structure. In this case algorithm causes significant processor burden. Therefore,
a dictionary with internal structure was used in our coder. Such dictionary is built from: atoms
and centered atoms. Centered atoms group such atoms from D that are as correlated (to each
other) as possible.
To calculate the measure of correlation between atoms, the function o(a,b) can be used (Jost et
al., 2005):
o (a,b) =
√
1−
( |〈a,b〉|
‖a‖2 ‖b‖2
)2
(4)
The quality of centered atom can be estimated according to (5):
Ok,l =
1∣∣LPk,l ∣∣ ∑i∈LPk,l o
(
Ac(i),Wc(k,l)
)
(5)
LPk,l is a set of atoms grouped by centered atom. Ok,l is mean of local distances from centered
atom Wc(k,l) to the atoms Ac(i) which are strongly correlated with Ac(i).
Example dictionary structure was presented in Figure 1. Atom tree consist of root node Wg
and every centroid consist of two children. Parameter Ac represents leaf nodes (without
children).
Centroid Wc(k,l) represents atoms Ac(i) which belong to the set i ∈ LPk,l . List of atoms LPk,l
should be selected according to the Equation 6:
max
i∈LPk,l
o
(
Ac(i),Wc(k,l)
)
≤ min
t∈D\LPk,l
o
(
Ac(t),Wc(k,l)
)
(6)
In the proposed ADS solution 1D real Gabor base function (Equation 7) was used to build
dictionary (Troop, 2004)(Gribonval, 2001).
αu,s,ξ,φ(t) = cu,s,ξ,φα(
t − u
s
)cos(2piξ(t − u) + φ) (7)
where:
α(t) =
1√
s
e−pit
2
(8)
cu,s,ξ,φ - is a normalizing constant used to achieve atom unit energy.
In order to create overcomplete set of 1D base functions dictionary D was built by varying
subsequent atom parameters: Frequency ξ and Phase φ, Position u, Scale s. Base functions
dictionary D was created with using 10 different scales (dyadic scales) and 50 different
frequencies.
Traffic Parameters are used to create one dimensional signal. This signal is decomposed with
the use of Matching Pursuit transformation. After MP decomposition we achieved projection
coefficients ck which are used for creating normal traffic profiles.
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Network Traffic Total number of Detected number Detection
Feature of attack of attack Rate [%]
ICMP flows/minute 73 61 84.93
ICMP in bytes/minute 73 31 43.83
ICMP out bytes/minute 73 39 54.79
ICMP in frames/minute 73 59 82.19
ICMP out frames/minute 73 65 90.41
TCP flows/minute 73 68 94.52
TCP in bytes/minute 73 32 46.57
TCP out bytes/minute 73 31 45.20
TCP in frames/minute 73 57 79.45
TCP out frames/minute 73 54 76.71
UDP flows/minute 73 41 58.90
UDP in bytes/minute 73 52 73.97
UDP out bytes/minute 73 73 100.00
UDP in frames/minute 73 52 73.97
UDP out frames/minute 73 70 98.63
Table 2. Detection Rate for W5D1 (Fifth Week, Day 1) (DARPA, 2000) trace
Matching Pursuit (Mallat et al., 1993),(Jost et al., 2005) algorithm (stop condition of the MP
algorithm) was modified in order to encode only sufficient number of atoms. This number of
atoms may be different for a given traffic (signal) analysis window (for e.g. for 10min. analysis
window number of encoded atoms may be between 3 and max 10). This operation causes a
significant reduction of the algorithm execution time.
Normal traffic profiles are calculated using input traffic without attack and anomalies. Normal
profiles are calculated separately for every traffic feature. Our ADS system compares current
traffic traces (to be analyzed) with the reference profiles calculated during normal work
Network Traffic Total number of Detected number Detection
Feature of attack of attack Rate [%]
ICMP flows/minute 68 49 72.06
ICMP in bytes/minute 68 56 82.35
ICMP out bytes/minute 68 54 79.41
ICMP in frames/minute 68 59 86.76
ICMP out frames/minute 68 56 82.35
TCP flows/minute 68 37 54.41
TCP in bytes/minute 68 41 60.29
TCP out bytes/minute 68 23 33.82
TCP in frames/minute 68 31 45.58
TCP out frames/minute 68 32 47.05
UDP flows/minute 68 66 97.05
UDP in bytes/minute 68 62 91.17
UDP out bytes/minute 68 60 88.23
UDP in frames/minute 68 62 91.18
UDP out frames/minute 68 60 88.24
Table 3. Detection Rate for W5D5 (Fifth Week, Day 5) (DARPA, 2000) trace
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Table 4. Matching Pursuit Mean Projection - MP-MP for TCP trace (20 min. analysis window)
(stored in a database). ADS system makes an alarm when difference between profiles exceed
certain threshold (we usually use the threshold value equal to 30%).
4. Evaluation of the proposed anomaly detection system based on matching
pursuit
In our previous work we showed the first results of the Matching Pursuit methodology for
anomaly detection using only one network traffic metric (feature), namely packets per second
(Saganowski et al. , 2009). Hereby, we in our anomaly detection system, we correlate much
more network traffic features (Table 1).
Performance of our approach was evaluated with the use of the following trace bases:
– (DARPA, 2000),
– (MAWI, 2005),
– (CAIDA, 2004),
– (UNINA, 2009) (University of Napoli network traces).
The test data contains attacks that fall into four main categories (Wei et al., 2009) such as:
1. DOS/DDOS: denial-of-service, e.g. syn flood,
2. R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g. guessing password,
3. U2R: unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges, e.g., various ”buffer
overflow” attacks,
4. PROBING: surveillance and other probing, e.g., port scanning.
6 Intrusion Detection Systems
TCP trace (packet/second) Window1 Window2 Window3 MPMP MPMP for
(MAWI, 2005) MPMP MPMP MPMP for trace normal trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 210.34 172.58 239.41 245.01 240.00
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 280.01 214.01 215.46 236.33 240.00
Mawi 20.03.2004 tcp 322.56 365.24 351.66 346.48 240.00
(attacked: Witty)
Mawi 25.03.2004 tcp 329.17 485.34 385.50 400.00 240.00
(attacked: Slammer)
UDP trace (packet/second) Window1 Window2 Window3 MPMP MPMP for
(MAWI, 2005) MPMP MPMP MPMP for trace normal trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 16.06 13.80 17.11 15.65 16.94
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 20.28 17.04 17.40 18.24 16.94
Mawi 20.03.2004 tcp 38.12 75.43 61.78 58.44 16.94
(attacked: Witty)
Mawi 25.03.2004 tcp 56.13 51.75 38.93 48.93 16.94
(attacked: Slammer)
Table 5. Matching Pursuit Mean Projection - MP-MP for UDP trace (20 min. analysis
window)
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Table 6. Matching Pursuit Mean Projection - MP-MP for TCP trace with DDoS attacks (20
min. analysis window)
For experiments we chose 20 minutes analysis window because most of attacks (about 85%)
ends within this time period. We extracted 16 traffic features in order to create 1D signals for
Matching Pursuit - Mean Projection analysis. Traffic features were calculated with the use of
1 minute time period.
In Table 2 and Table 3 detection rates achieved for DARPA benchmark trace base are
presented. These are results achieved for two test days. Detection results were compared
to the list of attacks which should exist in this two testing days.
In Table 4 and Table 5 there are results for MAWI test base. Bold numbers in tables point to
existence of anomalies/attacks in certain window.
In Table 6 there are results achieved for CAIDA test base. Traces consist of DDoS attacks and
every trace represents 1 hour of the network traffic.
5. Comparison of the matching pursuit with standard DWT using 15 traffic
parameters
The basic idea of wavelet transform is to decompose the input signal into family of some
specific functions that are called wavelets. Wavelets are functions that are generated through
a process of dilations and translations of one single function, which is usually called ”mother
wavelet”. The concept of wavelet transform was defined in (Grossman & Morlet , 1985). In
case of IDS system signal represents parameters of network traffic (such as number of packets
per second). Anomaly Detection System based on DWT and using 15 network features was
presented in (Wei et al., 2009).
In Table 7 comparison of our anomaly detection methodology to state-of-the-art DWT based
(Wei et al., 2009) signal processing ADS was presented. Both solutions were tested with the use
of the same DARPA (DARPA, 2000) test traces. DARPA benchmark traces consist of attacks
which belong to every layer of TCP/IP protocols stack.
In Table 7 the results for W5D1 (Week 5 Day 1) testday are reported. We used all 15 traffic
parameters presented in Table 1 during systems testing.
Detection rate and false positive rate achieved by our methodology based on Matching Pursuit
is better than in DWT based system presented in (Wei et al., 2009).
Detection rate is changing depending on the particular traffic feature. To recognize 100% of
anomalies for DARPA testbed we have to use 1 to max 4 traffic features.
We also significantly reduced false positive parameter in comparison to DWT-based ADS (Wei
et al., 2009). It is very important parameter in ADS systems, since the number of false positives
can not be overwhelming.
6. Conclusions
In the article our developments in feature extraction for Anomaly Detection Systems are
presented. The major contributions of our work is a novel algorithm for detecting anomalies
TCP trace (packet/second) Window1 Window2 Window3 MPMP MPMP for
(CAIDA, 2004) MPMP MPMP MPMP for trace normal trace
Backscatter 2008.11.15 147.64 411.78 356.65 305.35 153.66
Backscatter 2008.08.20 208.40 161.28 153.47 147.38 153.66
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Traffic Feature MP-MP DR[%] MP-MP FP[%] DWT DR[%] DWT FP[%]
ICMP flows/minute 68.49 20.54 14.00 79.33
ICMP in bytes/minute 79.45 27.39 83.33 416.00
ICMP out bytes/minute 73.97 32.87 83.33 416.00
ICMP in frames/minute 78.08 27.39 32.00 112.00
ICMP out frames/minute 72.60 30.13 32.00 112.00
TCP flows/minute 89.04 34.24 26.67 74.67
TCP in bytes/minute 47.94 32.87 8.67 23.33
TCP out bytes/minute 80.82 27.39 8.67 23.33
TCP in frames/minute 36.98 26.02 2.00 36.00
TCP out frames/minute 38.35 27.39 2.00 36.00
UDP flows/minute 89.04 41.09 10.00 74.67
UDP in bytes/minute 98.63 41.09 11.33 66.67
UDP out bytes/minute 100.00 46.57 11.33 66.67
UDP in frames/minute 98.63 39.72 12.67 66.67
UDP out frames/minute 100.00 46.57 12.67 66.67
Table 7. Proposed MP-MP ADS in comparision to DWT based ADS (Wei et al., 2009). Both
solutions were tested with the use of DARPA (DARPA, 2000) testbed (results in table are for
Week5 Day1 testday; DR-Detection Rate [%], FP-False Positive [%])
based on signal decomposition. In the classification/decision module we proposed to use
original matching pursuit features such as mean projection. As to our best knowledge, we are
the first to propose anomaly detection system based on Matching Pursuit.
We tested and evaluated the proposed approach and showed that experimental results proved
the effectiveness of the proposed method. We also provided the comparison of the Matching
Pursuit methods to DWT-based anomaly detection and reported better results in terms of
detection rate and false positives.
Our developments can be used in many deployments and applications, for instance
for military network security enhancement or critical infrastructures information systems
security.
Test Days W5D1 W5D2 W5D3 W5D4 W5D5
DR [%] for all attack instances - DWT 94.67 66.1 49.52 74.33 26.7
((Wei et al., 2009))
DR [%] for all attack instances - MPMP 100 100 100 100 100
(Matching Pursuit Mean Projection)
DR [%] attack types (DoS, U2R,R2L,PROBE) 100 75 71.43 88.89 74.1
- DWT ((Wei et al., 2009))
DR [%] attack types (DoS, U2R,R2L,PROBE) 100 100 100 100 100
- MPMP (Matching Pursuit Mean Projection)
Table 8. Cumulative DR - detection rate takes into consideration attacks recognized by all
traffic features presented in Table 1. Results were compared to results achieved for fifth test
week (Week5 Day1-5) of (DARPA, 2000) traces.
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